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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and ] 
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON 
Plaintiffs-Appellees, 
vs. 1 
VAUGHN BELNAP and • 
JEFFREY BELNAP ] 
Defendant-Appellant. ; 
i N o . 910108 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal from a Judgment in the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to §78-2-2 (3) (j), Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
For the purposes of this Brief, Plaintiffs-Appellees Joseph 
Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa McPherson will hereinafter be 
referred to collectively as "McPhersons". Defendant-Appellant 
Vaughn Belnap will be referred to as "Vaughn Belnap" and his son 
who is a co-Defendant, but who McPhersons were not able to serve 
will be referred to as "Jeffrey Belnap". 
1. Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the 
trial Court erred in concluding that Vaughn Belnap entered into a 
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contract of bailment with McPhersons, that Vaughn Belnap and the 
McPhersons entered into a relationship of bailee and bailor and 
that McPhersons1 personal property was delivered to Vaughn Belnap 
rather than Jeffrey Belnap, his son. 
2. Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the 
trial Court erred in concluding that the bailment created between 
the McPhersons and Vaughn Belnap was a bailment for mutual 
benefit, as opposed to a gratuitous bailment and that, 
consequently, a standard of simple negligence, as opposed to 
gross negligence, was applied. 
3. Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the 
trial Court erred in imposing a presumption of negligence on 
Vaughn Belnap. 
4. Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the 
trial Court erred in concluding that Vaughn Belnap was negligent 
and his negligence proximately caused the McPhersons1 injuries. 
5. Whether the clear weight of evidence demonstrates the 
trial Court erred in concluding that Vaughn Belnap failed to 
rebut the presumption of negligence. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The combined issues of law and fact each require a review of 
the finding of fact. The standard of appellate review requires 
that Vaughn Belnap marshall the evidence in support of the trial 
court findings and demonstrate that despite this evidence, the 
trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against 
the clear weight of evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
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STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is 
determinative of the issues on appeal in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1988, Vaughn Belnap purchased a home from the 
McPhersons. Thereafter, in or about September, 1988, after 
moving out of the home purchased from them by Vaughn Belnap, the 
McPhersons leased a condominium unit owned by Vaughn Belnap. 
(Trial Transcript p. 6, lines 8-16). The Lease Agreement was for 
a six month period of time from September, 1988 to February, 
1989. (Trial Transcript p. 7, lines 3-8). 
In late November, 1988, Vaughn Belnap contacted the 
McPhersons and indicated to them that he had a buyer for the 
condominium unit he was leasing to them. Vaughn Belnap requested 
that the McPhersons move out immediately as an accommodation to 
him. (Trial Transcript, p. 7, lines 24 - p. 8, line. 11). 
Because of the short notice, the only alternative lodging 
the McPhersons could obtain was a furnished apartment. In the 
McPhersons1 next meeting with Vaughn Belnap, the McPhersons 
indicated to Vaughn Belnap that they could vacate the condominium 
unit, however, the only alternative lodging that they could find 
was a furnished apartment, therefore they had no room to store 
their furniture which was currently in the condominium unit. The 
McPhersons further indicated that they would have to find a place 
to store their furniture before they could vacate the premises. 
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(Trial Transcript p. 12, lines 12 - p. 10, lines 25). Vaughn 
Belnap responded by disclosing to the McPhersons that Jeffrey 
Belnap, Vaughn Belnap1s son, was the individual who allegedly 
agreed to purchase the condominium unit from him. Vaughn Belnap 
further stated that as Jeffrey Belnap had no furniture, it would 
be all right if the McPhersons left their furniture in the 
condominium unit until such time as they moved the furniture to 
their permanent lodging. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-22; 
p. 32, lines 1-13). 
McPhersons advised Vaughn of their concern about the safety 
of their property while it was in the condominium unit. Vaughn 
Belnap stated to the McPhersons that the furniture would be fine. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 73, lines 10-16). 
The McPhersons dealt exclusively with Vaughn Belnap 
regarding storage of the furniture. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, 
lines 5-25; p. 11 lines 18 - p. 12, lines 7; p. 14, lines 6-14; 
p. 32 lines 1-13). 
Approximately ten to eleven days after being informed that 
the condominium unit was allegedly sold, McPhersons vacated the 
condominium unit leaving a number of items of personal property 
in the unit. After the McPhersons vacated the condominium unit, 
Jeffrey Belnap allegedly moved into the condominium unit, not as 
a purchaser but allegedly as a tenant. (Trial Transcript, p. 64, 
ins. 5-17). After vacating the condominium, McPhersons no longer 
had access to the condominium unit. McPhersons did not have keys 
or any other way to obtain free access to their furniture to the 
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inside of the condominium. In order to gain access to the 
property in the condominium unit, they contacted Vaughn Belnap. 
(Trial Transcript p. 35, line 19 - p. 36, line 4. 
In early December of 1988, McPhersons ran into Vaughn Belnap 
at an automobile dealership in Salt Lake. At that time, 
McPhersons indicated to Vaughn Belnap that they had a found an 
unfurnished condominium to move into and that they wanted to 
pick up their furniture. (Trial Transcript p. 15, line 18 - p. 
16, line 5). 
The next day, a message was left at McPhersons1 office by 
Vaughn Belnap that indicated that the property that was stored at 
the condominium unit had been stolen. The furniture and other 
items of personal property owned by McPhersons and left in the 
condominium unit were reported stolen on December 15, 1988. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 16, line 6 - p. 17, line 18). 
On December 15, 1988, a neighbor saw a pickup truck occupied 
by two men loaded with furniture parked in front of the 
condominium unit. The neighbor could identify neither Vaughn 
Belnap nor Jeffrey Belnap as occupants of the truck. (Trial 
Transcript, p. 55, ins. 11-25; p. 56, ins. 104). The police 
officer investigating the crime found no evidence of forcible 
entry. He further indicated that in his opinion the 
circumstances looked suspicious. (Trial Transcript, p. 46, lines 
1-6 and p. 47, lines 1-25). 
Vaughn Belnap testified that he lived in the condominium 
unit prior to the time it was occupied by McPhersons. Vaughn 
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Belnap further testified that at the time he lived in the 
condominium unit, the doors were equipped with dead bolt locks. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 68, lines 21 - p. 69, line 8). 
Jeffrey Belnap testified that even though it had been over 
18 months, he remembered locking the door on the date of the 
robbery. (Trial Transcript, p. 51, line 20 - p. 52, line 10). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The trial Court found that McPhersons1 property was 
placed in the possession and control of Vaughn Belnap. Vaughn 
Belnap, in an effort to avoid liability, claims there is no 
evidence to support the trial Court's findings. In fact, 
evidence shows that McPhersons dealt exclusively with Vaughn 
Belnap and not his son, Jeffrey Belnap, with respect to the 
storage of the property. Evidence shows that the agreement 
entered into between the parties was between Vaughn Belnap and 
the McPhersons and that Vaughn Belnap later turned control of the 
property over to his son Jeffrey Belnap. Finally, the facts show 
that Vaughn Belnap was the sole owner of the condominium unit at 
the time the property was stored and that in order to gain access 
to the property, the McPhersons contacted Vaughn Belnap. Thus, 
the evidence supports the trial Court's finding that a bailee-
bailor relationship existed between Vaughn Belnap and the 
McPhersons. 
2. Vaughn Belnap further claims that the trial Court erred 
in finding that the bailment agreement entered into between the 
parties was a bailment for mutual benefit. Contrary to Vaughn 
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Belnap1s contention, the clear evidence supports the trial 
Court's finding that the bailment was for the mutual benefit of 
the parties. Both parties testified and it is undisputed that 
the McPhersons1 agreement to move from the condominium unit prior 
to the expiration of the lease benefitting Vaughn Belnap by 
allowing him to proceed with an alleged sale. The facts 
demonstrate that in order to make it possible for the McPhersons 
to move out, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store their furniture until 
such time as they had accommodations that could facilitate the 
furniture. This bailment agreement benefited both Vaughn Belnap 
and the McPhersons, therefore, it was a bailment for mutual 
benefit. 
3. A presumption of negligence may be imposed on bailee 
when the bailee has exclusive possession and control of the 
bailed goods at the time of delivery. Vaughn Belnap claims there 
is no evidence which supports the trial Court's conclusion that 
at the time the property was delivered, it was delivered to the 
exclusive possession of Vaughn Belnap. However, the evidence 
shows the McPhersons entered into an agreement with Vaughn Belnap 
and not Jeffrey Belnap to store the furniture in the condominium 
unit and the furniture was left with Vaughn Belnap. Only after 
the property was delivered to the exclusive possession of Vaughn 
Belnap did Vaughn Belnap turn over the care of the property to 
Jeffrey Belnap. Vaughn Belnap should not be able to escape 
liability for property that turned over to his possession by 
subsequently turning over the care and security of the property 
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to his son Jeffrey Belnap. 
4. Vaughn Belnap finally contends that even if the 
presumption of negligence was correctly imposed by the trial 
Court, through the clear weight of evidence, he rebutted that 
presumption. The only evidence that Vaughn Belnap can point to 
to support his claim is that he locked the doors and windows on 
the condominium when he lived in the condominium unit prior to 
the time the McPhersons leased the unit from him. Further, 
Vaughn Belnap1s son, Jeffrey Belnap, testified that even though 
it had been over 18 months since the date the property was 
allegedly stolen, he remembered locking the doors on that 
particular day. Thus, the only evidence that Vaughn Belnap 
presented was a self-serving statement of his son, Jeffrey 
Belnap, that the doors and windows were locked when he left the 
premises on that particular day. As is evident, Vaughn Belnap 
failed to present any evidence sufficient to rebut the 
presumption of negligence. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
RULING THAT A CONTRACT OF BAILMENT WAS 
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE MCPHERSONS AND 
VAUGHN BELNAP 
A. Aplicable Law 
In order to establish the existence of a bailment agreement, 
the following facts must be shown: (1) Deliver of the property 
to the bailee; (2) acceptance of exclusive possession by the 
bailee; and (3) an agreement that the property will be returned 
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to the bailee at the expiration of the bailment. Wright v. Auto 
Haus Hortence, Inc., 472 N.E.2d 593 (1984). As stated in 8 
C.J.S., §1 "A bailment is consensual relation that includes, in 
its broadest sense, any delivery of personal property and trust 
for a lawful purpose". Id. at 314. The assumption of control is 
a determining factor: 
[A] bailee is one who receives personal property 
from another in trust for a specific purpose, with a 
contract, express or implied, that the trust shall be 
faithfully executed and the property returned or duly 
accounted for when the special purpose is accomplished. 
8 C.J.S. Bailments, §1, p. 321. 
Where there is a change or acceptance of possession depends 
on whether there is a change or acceptance of actual or potential 
control in fact over the subject matter. Collins v. Boeing Co,, 
483 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Wash. App. 1971). As stated by the Oregon 
Court of Appeals in Jackson v. Miller, 598 P.2d 1255 (OR. App. 
1979): 
Possession is defined to include the intent to 
exercise control over goods.... The intent to possess 
to assume custody or control over an object, is 
generally regarded as important an element of 
possession as actual physical control. Given exactly 
the same relation to an object, the person may or may 
not be held to be in possession thereof, according to 
whether or not he had the intent to exercise control 
over it. (Citing Brown, Personal Property, §10.3 
(217). 
Id at 1257. 
The trial Court in its Findings of Fact found as follows 
with respect to the agreement between McPhersons and Vaughn 
Belnap: 
2. In or about December, 1988, during the term of 
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the lease, Vaughn Belnap had the opportunity to sell 
the condominium. Vaughn Belnap asked Plaintiffs if 
they would be able to vacate the condominium as soon as 
possible as he had found a buyer for the property. 
Plaintiffs agreed to vacate the condominium to 
accommodate the sale, as long as Vaughn Belnap would 
let them leave the furniture in the condominium until 
such time as they could locate a residence which would 
accommodate their furniture. Vaughn Belnap agreed to 
this condition and stated that the furniture would be 
of a benefit to him because his son, Jeffrey Belnap, 
who was in the midst of a divorce proceeding, could use 
the furniture. 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law R. 202, Para. 2). Based 
on this finding of fact, the trial Court found that Vaughn Belnap 
and McPhersons entered into a contract of bailment, that they 
therefore stood in a relationship of bailee and bailor and the 
McPhersons1 personal property was delivered to Vaughn Belnap and 
his son Jeffrey Belnap. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, R. 203, Para. 7; 204, Para. 1). As stated by the trial 
Court in its Memorandum Decision dated September 14, 1990: 
The Court has concluded under the fact situation a 
bailment was created. Plaintiffs delivered to 
Defendant Vaughn Belnap not Jeffrey Belnap, the 
furniture, with the express understanding the furniture 
would be returned to Plaintiffs. 
B. The Evidence Supports The Trial Court's 
Finding That Bailment Was Entered Into 
Between McPhersons And Vaughn Belnap. 
1. Vaughn Belnap in his Brief maintains that the evidence 
does not support the trial Court's finding that a bailment was 
entered into between McPhersons and Vaughn Belnap. However, as 
will be shown below, the trial Court's findings are supported by 
the evidence of the case. The following evidence supports the 
trial Court"s conclusion that a bailment was entered into between 
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Vaughn, It was Vaughn who had purchased our home. It 
was Vaughn with which I had developed a comfort zone 
with, and it was basically it. I was going off the 
assurances that his son was responsible and would take 
care of the property. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 11, line 12 - p. 12, line 4). 
c. After being questioned by the Court, Edward McPherson 
stated as follows regarding his conversation with Vaughn Belnap 
at the time Vaughn agreed to store McPherson's furniture: 
The witness: When we were talking we said we were 
going to have to find a place for the furniture. At 
that time he said that his son had no furniture when he 
was just going through a divorce, and, you know, if we 
wanted to leave the furniture, that would be fine until 
we could find a permanent place for it, because — 
this thing was a very inconvenient thing for everyone 
involved. 
The Court: What did you say? 
The witness: I said that was fine. The only 
thing we were concerned about was, you know, whether or 
not Jeff would take care of the - - you know be 
responsible for the furniture, I mean take care of it. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 14, lines 7-20). 
d. In rebuttal to Defendant's testimony, Edward McPherson 
testified as follows regarding the agreement between the parties: 
Q: And how did - - what did Mr. Belnap state to 
you? 
A: He said that it would probably be fine. We 
were - - I was looking to Vaughn because I did not know 
his son. Vaughn had just purchased the place from me. 
Vaughn owned the condominium and it was Vaughn I was 
looking to for security, because had it not been for 
Vaughn I would never have left the property at the 
house with his son. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 73, lines 14-22). 
2. In addition to the evidence already recited, the 
following evidence support the trial Court's finding that Vaughn 
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McPhersons and Defendant Vaughn Belnap: 
a. On direct examination, Joseph McPherson testified as 
follows regarding circumstances regarding his decision to leave 
his furniture with Vaughn Belnap: 
Q: Did you, after initial contact with Mr. 
Belnap, did you speak with Mr. Belnap again regarding 
this matter? 
A: We did. I believe he was - - I believe we 
spoke to him at the condominium, 902 West New Hampton, 
and told him that, you know, we had found a place but 
it was furnished and now we had to do something with 
our furniture. And he indicated at that time that his 
- - it was his son - - it would be his son moving in 
and he was just getting divorced and he had no 
furniture. And so it was - - you know, he said, well, 
he wouldn't mind if that was left there, he would take 
good care of it. I was concerned because the furniture 
we had was very expensive, very nice furniture, and I 
was a little uncomfortable leaving that furniture 
there. But it was Vaughn, he was the person I was 
dealing with because it was Vaughn who had bought our 
house. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-22). 
b. As to Mr. McPherson's understanding regarding the 
agreement between him and Vaughn Belnap, and basis for that 
understanding Edward McPherson testified as follows: 
Q: Can you tell me what your understanding of the 
agreement was that you had with Vaughn Belnap regarding 
the storage of the furniture. 
A: Well, we wanted to just - - the furniture was 
just to be left there long enough until we could find a 
permanent place to live. 
Q: Now, you stated before that it was your 
understanding that the agreement was between you and 
Mr. Belnap. What was the basis of your understanding? 
A: Well, being the basis - - the basis of the 
understanding was that he furniture was just to be left 
there long enough until we could find a place to live 
and it was done with - - my whole dealings were with 
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Belnap had actual and/or constructive possession and control of 
the bailed property. 
a. Vaughn Belnap was the sole owner of the condominium unit 
at the time the property was stored; (Trial Transcript, p. 37, 
lines 4-15). 
b. McPhersons1 agreement with respect to storage of the 
property was with Vaughn Belnap, not Jeff Belnap and McPhersons 
dealt exclusively with Vaughn Belnap. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, 
lines 5-25; p. 11, line 18 - p. 12, line 7; p. 14, lines 6-14) 
c. McPherson did not have access to the furniture in the 
condominium. In order to gain access to the property that was 
stored, McPhersons had to contact Vaughn Belnap or his son, 
Jeffrey Belnap. (Trial Transcript p. 35, line 19 - p. 36, line 
4). 
3. The evidence supports the trial Court's conclusion that 
Jeffrey Belnap was an agent, under the direction and control of 
Defendant Vaughn Belnap. (Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-2 5; 
p. 11 line 18 - p. 12, line 7; p. 14, lines 6-14; p. 32 lines 1-
13). 
4. Edward McPherson on both direct and cross examination 
testified jthat Vaughn Belnap, not Jeffrey Belnap agreed to allow 
the McPhersons to store the furniture. Edward McPherson on 
direct examination stated as follows: 
Q: Did you, after the initial contact with Mr. 
Belnap, did you speak with Mr. Belnap regarding this 
matter? 
A: We did, I believe he was - - I believe we 
spoke to him at the condominium at 902 West New Hampton 
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and told him that, you know, we had found a place but 
it was furnished and now we had to do something with 
our furniture and he indicated at that time - - it was 
his son, and - - it would be his son moving in and that 
he was just getting divorced and he had no furniture 
and so it was - - well, he wouldn't mind if that was 
left there, he would take good care of it. (Emphasis 
added). 
(Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 5-16). 
Edward McPherson on cross examination testified as follows: 
A: We found a furnished place because that was 
our only option because of the circumstances 
surrounding the whole movement of displacing us out of 
a condominium which we had leased and which we were 
willing to break in order to accommodate Vaughn. Then 
we had indicated that now we needed a place for our 
furniture, he indicated his son was getting divorced 
and had no furniture, that it would be okay if we left 
the furniture there until he found a permanent place to 
live. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 32, ines 4-13). 
C. Application Of The Law Of The Evidence. 
Vaughn Belnap seeks to avoid liability for the furniture by 
claiming that an agreement was not entered into by him and the 
McPhersons but his son and the McPhersons. Accordingly, Vaughn 
Belnap argues there is no evidence that he agreed to hold the 
furniture for the benefit of the McPhersons or that he agreed to 
return the furniture. However, the fact that a bailment 
agreement entered into between McPhersonfs is supported by the 
clear weight of evidence. 
The facts show the condominium unit where the furniture was 
stored was solely owned by Vaughn Belnap. The facts show that in 
order to induce the McPhersons to move out of the condominium 
unit, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store their furniture until such 
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time as they had a place that could accommodate the furniture. 
All the negotiations regarding storage of the furniture took 
place between Vaughn Belnap and the McPhersons, Jeffrey Belnap 
was not involved. Further, the facts are undisputed that based 
on Vaughn Belnap's assurances, the property was left in the 
condominium unit with the understanding that the property would 
be returned. Finally, the undisputed facts evidence that 
McPhersons did not have access to their furniture in the 
condominium unit and were required to contact the Belnaps in 
order to gain access. These facts clearly support the trial 
Court's ruling that a bailment agreement was entered into between 
Vaughn Belnap and McPhersons. 
II. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDING THATTHE BAILMENT ENTERED INTO 
BETWEEN THE PARTIES WAS A BAILMENT FOR 
MUTUAL BENEFIT 
A. Applicable Law 
Bailments traditionally fall into three categories: (1) 
Bailment for the sole benefit of the bailor (also known as a 
gratuitous bailment); (2) Bailment for the sole benefit of the 
bailee; and (3) Bailment for the mutual benefit of the bailor 
and the bailee (also known as a bailment for hire or the bailment 
for the mutual benefit of the parties). (See e.g., Christensen 
v. Hoover, 643 P.2d 525 (Colo. 1982); 8 Am Jur 2d Bailments, §17. 
The standard of care imposed on a bailee depends on the nature of 
the bailment. 
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B. The Evidence Supports The Trial Court's 
Finding That Bailment Entered Into Between 
McPhersons And Vaughn Belnap Was A Bailment 
For Mutual Benefit, 
With respect to the issue of the type of bailment entered 
into between Vaughn Belnap and the McPhersons, the trial Court 
found as follows: 
The Court fully believes that [the] bailment was 
for the mutual benefit of both parties. The Plaintiffs 
accommodated Defendant Vaughn in furthering the sale of 
the condominium by moving out prior to the expiration 
of the lease and by allowing Vaughn Belnap to use their 
furniture in furtherance of the sale of the condominium 
to his son who had no furniture. 
(Findings of Fact R. 203, Para. 8). 
The following evidence supports the trial Court's finding 
that the bailment was for the mutual benefit of both parties: 
1. As discussed above, the undisputed evidence shows that 
after entering a Lease Agreement with the McPhersons for a period 
of six months, Vaughn Belnap contacted the McPhersons and 
requested that they move out of the condominium unit prior to the 
expiration of the lease in order to allow him to sell the 
condominium unit to a prospective buyer. Edward McPherson in his 
direct examination gave the following testimony: 
Q: After you moved into the condominium unit, did 
Mr. Belnap subsequently request that you vacate the 
unit? 
A: He did, shortly - - shortly thereafter, he 
notified us and said that he had gotten a buyer for the 
condo and could we accommodate him by moving out. And 
it was moving out early because we had just been there, 
I believe only a couple of months. 
Q: Do you know approximately what time that — 
what the date was when he asked you to vacate the 
premises? 
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A: I believe it was sometime towards the end of 
November, beginning of December. 
Q: What happened after he requested that you 
vacate the premises? 
A: Well, we were under the impression that it was 
sold to an independent buyer, and at that time - - then 
later we found out it was actually sold to his son, 
that he was moving into the condo. I had no idea what 
the agreements were then, but that we were trying to do 
was be very helpful in trying to relieve Vaughn of some 
of his debts, because he had just purchased a home from 
us and he had a very large balloon payment due in a 
year and a half and anything we could do to accommodate 
him in making that easier, or making it easier for him 
to sell his property - - we would do anything we could 
do to accommodate him so that is why - - it was a 
terrible inconvenience for us to move out on very short 
notice. It was right during the holidays, it was, you 
know, a busy time for me and it was just - - once we 
found out - - I was a little bit irritated by the fact 
that I found it was, you know, his son and that we were 
inconvenienced, you know, having to move out so quickly 
when it could have been done in a more reasonable time. 
(Trial transcript, p. 7, line 25 - p. 9, line 8). 
2. Vaughn Belnap in direct examination by Plaintiffs1 
counsel admitted he benefited from McPhersons agreeing to move 
out of the condominium unit which could only be accomplished if 
he agreed to store their furniture. Vaughn Belnap's testimony is 
as follows: 
Q: In or about September, 1988, did you lease a 
condominium unit to Ed and Lisa McPherson? 
A: Yes I did. 
Q: At the time you leased the condominium unit, 
did you enter into a Lease Agreement with McPhersons? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was that Lease Agreement for a six month 
period of time? 
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A: I believe it was from September 1st to the end 
of February. 
Q: September 1st of what year to February 1st of 
what year? 
A: 1988 to 1989. 
Q: In or about late November or early December, 
1988, did you contact the McPhersons regarding the 
McPhersons moving from the condominium unit? 
A: Yes I did. 
Q: Did you ask the McPhersons to move from the 
condominium unit? 
A: I asked them if it would be possible for them 
to do so yes. 
Qj What was the reason that you asked them to 
move? 
A: My son Jeff had approached me and had 
requested to buy the condominium from me because he was 
going through a divorce at the present time and it 
would be convenient for him to move into the 
condominium soon so I approached them and asked them if 
they would move out sooner that anticipated. 
Q: Would it have benefited you if your son had 
purchased the condominium unit? 
A: Obviously. 
Q: So the McPhersons moving out was an 
accommodation to you; correct? 
A: That is correct. 
(Trial Transcript, p. 37 line 4 - p. 38, line 23). 
c. Application Of Law To Evidence. 
Vaughn Belnap in his Appellate Brief concedes that the 
evidence clearly establishes the McPhersons accommodated him by 
vacating the condominium unit. However, Vaughn Belnap still 
argues that the trial Court's finding that the bailment was for 
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the mutual benefit of the parties is not supported by the 
evidence. 
Contrary to Vaughn Belnap's contention, the evidence 
supports the trial Courts finding that the bailment was for 
mutual benefit of the parties. Both parties testified and it is 
undisputed that McPhersons1 agreement to move from the 
condominium unit prior to the expiration of the lease benefitted 
Vaughn Belnap by allowing him to proceed with an alleged sale of 
his condominium unit. However, prior to agreeing to move from 
the condominium unit, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store McPherson's 
furniture until such time as they had accommodations that could 
facilitate the furniture. Thus, Vaughn Belnap's agreement to 
store the subject property benefited both parties. The bailment 
agreement benefited Vaughn Belnap by making it possible for 
McPhersons to move out of the condominium unit which benefited 
Vaughn Belnap by allowing him to consummate the alleged sale. 
Further, having the furniture available helped Vaughn Belnap in 
furthering the subsequent use of the condominium unit by his son. 
Ill 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S IMPOSITION OF THE 
PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE. 
A. Applicable law. 
It is well established that in a bailment for a mutual 
benefit of the parties, the bailee is required to exercise 
ordinary care. Anniston Lincoln Mercury v. Mayse. 341 S.2d 949 
(Ala. 1977) . Ordinary care is that care that a reasonable and 
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prudent person would exercise in dealing with his or her own 
property, Verenhoff Corp, v. Aetna Insurance Co., 366 S.2d 457 
(Fla. App. 1976). In analyzing whether a bailee has breached the 
standard of care, the courts unanimously agree that in a bailment 
for the mutual benefit of the parties, the bailor can establish a 
presumption of bailee's negligence, and thus a breach of the 
bailment agreement, by proving that the property was delivered to 
the bailee in good condition and the bailee either (1) failed to 
return it; or (2) returned the property in damaged condition. 
Staheli v. Farmers Cooperative of Southern Utah. 655 P.2d 680 
(Utah 1980). The leading Utah case concerning the imposition of 
the presumption of negligence in the contexts of a bailment is 
the Staheli case. The facts in Staheli are as follows: 
The Defendant was engaged in the business of providing grain 
storage to local farmers. In the year in question, the Defendant 
did not have enough storage to accommodate the requirements of 
the area farmers, consequently, it leased a large potato cellar 
from a cellar and storage company to provide additional temporary 
storage capacity. The portion of the cellar which was not leased 
to the Defendant was retained and used by the owner of the 
cellar. The farmers who stored their grain also had unlimited 
access to this potato cellar where the grain was being stored. 
Subsequently, a fire in the cellar damaged the grain and 
Plaintiff, Staheli brought suit against the Farmer's Co-Op. The 
trial Court entered judgment in favor of the Defendant Farmer's 
Co-Op finding that the presumption of negligence did not imply 
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under the facts of the case because the facts did not show that 
Defendant had exclusive control over the potato cellar where the 
grain was stored. 
On appeal; Plaintiff argued that it was entitled to the 
presumption of negligence and the Defendant Co-Op was negligent 
as a matter of law and that the Defendant Co-Op did not rebut 
that presumption. The Defendant Co-Op argued that the 
presumption of negligence should not arise and therefore the 
burden of proof did not shift to it because it did not have 
exclusive possession over the bailed goods. 
The Court in Staheli, in determining whether the presumption 
of negligence should arise under the circumstances explained the 
rationale for the general rule regarding the presumption of 
negligence being imposed on the bailee. The Court stated as 
follows: 
The policy that sustains a presumption arises from 
the practical considerations that one who is in the 
possession of another's property is in a better 
position to control the conditions that may cause loss 
or damage and to know, or at least be able to ascertain 
the cause of any actual loss or damage. A predicate of 
the presumption therefore, is that the bailee be in 
exclusive possession, and it is that proposition that 
gives logical force to the presumption.... 
Not withstanding the presumption, the law does not 
make the bailee for hire a guarantor; it is a rule of 
fault with which we deal. Thus, the presumption 
allocates the burden of proof to the party most likely 
to have access to th evidence, and, in the absence of 
evidence, places liability on the party most likely to 
have been able to avert the loss. 
Id. at 683. 
This Court in Staheli went on to conclude that as the record 
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did not establish the Defendant Co-op had the exclusive right and 
power of control over the grain in the cellar, the presumption of 
negligence should not apply. This Court in coming to its 
decision specifically noted that the trial Court found that: 
Plaintiffs as well as the agents of Defendant had 
unlimited access to the said potato pit either through 
the doors on the end temporarily leased by the 
Defendant or through the doors on the end retained by 
the owner, neither which was locked. 
Id. at 684. 
B. The Evidence Support The Trial Court's 
Finding That The Property At The Time Of 
Delivery Was Under The Exclusive Control Of 
Defendant Vaughn Belnap. 
In the present case, the trial Court made the following 
finding with respect to the application of the presumption of 
negligence in this case. 
The Court believes that under the fact situation 
of the case, bailment was created. Plaintiffs 
delivered to Defendant Vaughn Belnap, not Jeffrey 
Belnap, the furniture with the express understanding 
that the furniture would be returned to Plaintiffs. 
(Finding of Fact, R. 203 7) 
1. As discussed above, Edward McPherson in his testimony 
indicates that he delivered the property to Vaughn Belnap and not 
Jeffrey Belnap. (Trial Transcript p. 10, lines 5-22; p. 32, 
lines 1-13). 
2. The evidence further shows that the agreement entered 
into with respect to the bailed property was between the 
McPherson and Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey Belnap his son. 
(Trial Transcript p. 11, lines 21 - p. 12 line 7; p. 14, lines 6-
14; p. 32 lines 1-13). 
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3. Vaughn Belnap was the sole owner of the condominium unit 
at the time the property was delivered. (Trial transcript p. 6, 
lines 17-19; p. 37 lines 13-23). 
4. McPhersons did not have access to property within the 
condominium unit. In order to attempt to gain access to their 
furniture, they contacted Vaughn Belnap. (Trial Transcript p. 
35, line 19 - p. 36, line 4). 
B. Application Of Law To The Evidence. 
In the present case, Vaughn Belnap attempts to void 
liability by claiming that the property stored in a condominium 
unit was being used by his son Jeffrey Belnap and therefore he 
did not have exclusive possession of the property. Vaughn Belnap 
claims that under the Staheli case, the trial court erred in 
applying the presumption of negligence. 
In determining whether a party has exclusive possession, the 
Court should look at who had actual or constructive control over 
the bailed property at the time it was initially delivered, not 
what subsequently happened to the property when it was under the 
bailee's control. In the present case, the evidence shows that 
at the time the property was delivered by the McPhersons, it was 
delivered to Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey Belnap. As the 
evidence shows, Vaughn Belnap agreed to store the furniture in 
the condominium unit and indicated that the furniture would be 
safe there even though his son intended to occupy the unit. 
Thus, it was Vaughn Belnap who turned over the care of the 
property in his condominium to his son, Jeffrey. As stated by 
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the trial court in its Memorandum Decision, dated January 4, 
1991: 
In this case, as the Court pointed out to counsel 
at the time of oral argument, the bailee should not be 
able to escape liability by turning over the care and 
security of the property to an employee, representative 
or agent• Vaughn Belnap elected his son as the 
caretaker of the furniture and therefore must assume 
responsibility for its safety. 
(R. 134 and 135)• 
Further, the present case is distinguishable from the facts 
of the Staheli case. In the present case, unlike in the Staheli 
case, the property in question was delivered to Vaughn Belnap and 
stored in a condominium owned exclusive by Vaughn Belnap. The 
facts further show that McPhersons, unlike the farmers in the 
Staheli case, did not have access to the furniture which was 
stored in Vaughn Belnap's condominium. The facts show that when 
McPhersons wanted to gain access to their property they contacted 
Vaughn Belnap. Therefore, the facts in the present case, unlike 
in the Staheli case, indicate that Vaughn Belnap had exclusive 
control over the bailed property. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT VAUGHN 
BELNAP DID NOT REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF 
NEGLIGENCE. 
A. Applicable Law. 
Once it is determined that a bailment for mutual benefit was 
entered into, and the bailed goods lost, damaged or destroyed, a 
presumption of negligence is imposed on the bailee. The bailee 
then must come forth with evidence that the loss or damage was 
not due to the bailee's negligence. Staheli v. Farmers 
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Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 682 (1982). 
B. Evidence Support The Trial Court's 
Findings. 
In the present case, the trial court found that Vaughn 
Belnap failed to rebut the presumption that the loss of furniture 
was not a result of his negligence. (Findings of Fact, Para. 9; 
Conclusions of Law Para. 3, R. 204-205). The only evidence 
presented concerning the exercise of care by Vaughn Belnap is as 
follows: 
Q: You lived in the condominium unit prior to 
September, 1980, is that correct? 
A: That's correct. 
Q: Did you have locks on the doors? 
A: Yes, normal locks and dead bolt doors. 
Q: I assume that the windows were in place? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Normal security? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Was there any difference in the security at 
the time you lived in it and when Jeff lived in it? 
A: No. 
(Trial transcript p. 68, lines 21-25; p. 69, lines 1-8). 
In addition, Jeffrey Belnap claimed that even though 18 
months had passed, he remembered locking the door on the day the 
property was stolen. (Trial transcript, p. 51, line 23 - p. 52, 
line 10). 
C. Application Of Law To The Evidence. 
Vaughn Belnap contends that even if the presumption of 
25 
negligence was correctly imposed by the trial Court, under clear 
weight of evidence he rebutted that presumption. The only 
evidence that Vaughn Belnap can point to to support his 
contention is his claim that he had locks on the windows and 
doors when he lived at the condominium prior to the McPhersons 
and the testimony of his son, Jeffrey Belnap, who claims that 
even though it has been over 18 months since the date the 
property was allegedly stolen, he remembers locking the doors on 
that particular day. As is evident, this testimony is highly 
questionable. Further, it is insufficient to rebut the 
presumption of negligence. As stated by the trial court in its 
January 4, 1991 Memorandum Decision: 
In this case Vaughn Belnap contends that the 
furniture was stolen from the condominium, but there is 
no evidence of forcible entry. The only evidence 
presented was the self-serving statement of Jeffrey 
Belnap that the doors and windows were locked when he 
left the premises. 
(R. 135). 
CONCLUSION 
As is shown, the trial court's award of judgment to the 
McPhersons is supported by the evidence. The evidence shows that 
McPhersons left their property with Vaughn Belnap and not Jeffrey 
Belnap at a condominium unit owned by Vaughn Belnap. Further, 
the facts show that the agreement entered into between the 
parties was a bailment for mutual benefit. Vaughn Belnap in his 
testimony admitted that he benefited from the McPhersons1 
agreement to move from the condominium unit which could only be 
accomplished if Vaughn Belnap would agree to store the 
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McPhersons1 property. Further, the facts show that at the time 
the property was delivered, it was delivered to Vaughn Belnap and 
not Jeffrey Belnap. Jeffrey Belnap was not involved in the 
negotiation for the storage of the property. Only after the 
property was delivered did Vaughn Belnap turn the care of the 
property over to his son, Jeffrey Belnap. Finally, evidence 
supports the Court's conclusion that Vaughn Belnap failed to 
rebut the presumption of negligence. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /B day of July, 1991. 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
scorms. KUNKEL 
Attorney for Appellees 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that on the v day of July, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellees was 
mailed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Larry G. Reed 
Crowther & Reed 
455 South 300 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Memorandum Decision, Dated September 14, 1990 
Memorandum Decision [re: Motion for New Trial], Dated January 2, 
1991 
Order [Denying Motion for New Trial and Objections to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law], dated January 24, 1991 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, dated January 24, 1991 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
L»V;Jou> wtes'A 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and 
JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 




CIVIL NO. 890902949 PD 
This case was tried on August 1990 before the 
Court, without a jury. Plaintiff Joseph McPherson was present 
and represented by Scott S. Kunkel. Plaintiff Joan Elissa 
McPherson was not present. The defendants, Vaughn Belnap and 
Jeffrey Belnap were present and represented by Larry G. Reed. 
The Court heard testimony of the witnesses, admitted 
documentary evidence, heard oral argument and took the matter 
under advisement. The Court now being fully advised, enters 
its ruling. 
This case arose as a result of the defendant Vaughn Belnap 
leasing to the plaintiffs a condominium for a term of six 
months. During the term of the lease defendant, Vaughn Belnap, 
had an opportunity to sell the condominium. He requested that 
MCPHERSON V. BELNAP PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
the furniture as agreed. Defendant Vaughn Belnap failed to 
prove that the loss of the furniture was not as a result of his 
negligence. 
As a result of defendant Vaughn Belnap being unable to 
return the furniture to the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs suffered 
damages in the sum of $6,000.00, together with their costs and 
interest. 
The Court refers the parties to plaintiff's Trial Brief for 
additional reasons in support of its decision. 
Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with this 
Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this day of September, 1990. 
^JL A (RJLi 
ApHjjr A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
By. 
F!L£Q DSSTfJiCT C5U«riT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 1991 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and 
JOAN ELISSA MCPHERSON, 
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vs. 




CIVIL NO. 890902949 PD 
Defendant Vaughn Belnap's Motion for New Trial or Direct 
Entry of Judgment in Favor of Defendant, Motion to Tax Bill of 
Costs, Objection to form of Judgment and proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law were heard on the 2 6th day of 
November, 1990. Plaintiffs were represented by Scott S. 
Kunkel. Defendant was represented by Larry G. Reed. 
The Court read the Memoranda filed by the respective 
parties, heard oral argument, and took the matter under 
advisement. The Court now rules. 
The first issue the Court will address is whether or not 
defendant Vaughn Belnap was negligent in failing to return the 
plaintiffs' furniture since there was a bailment for the mutual 
benefit of the parties. 
MCPHERSON V. BELNAP PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The findings in the Staheli case were: 
All of the parties were aware of the easy 
access to all parts of the potato pit at all 
times crucial herein and most, if not all, along 
with third party owner of the potato pit and 
others were in and out of the premises as they 
desired or as their business dictated. Doors 
were left open and little or no concern was 
expressed by anyone concerning the other stored 
equipment or materials, which plaintiffs would 
now have this court find constituted an 
unreasonable risk of the loss that actually 
occurred or that the defendant had responsibility 
under the law to control transients at or near 
the premises, which plaintiffs further 
hypothesized may have caused the fire. 
The facts in this case and the Staheli case in this Court's 
opinion are not similar; therefore, the Court cannot come to 
the same conclusion as Vaughn Belnap has reached. 
The Staheli case held that "one who is in possession of 
another's property is in a better position to control the 
conditions that may cause the loss and to know, or at least to 
be able to ascertain the cause of any actual loss or damage." 
A predicate of the presumption, therefore, is that the bailee 
be in exclusive possession, and it is that proposition that 
gives logical force to the presumption. 
In this case, as the Court pointed out to counsel at the 
time of oral argument, the bailee should not be able to escape 
MCPHERSON V. BELNAP PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiffs' counsel shall prepare an Order in accordance 
with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this z _day of January, 1991. 
:
^ A 
pOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
1,...- .ii.-j.K.izi District 
JAMES E. MORTON, #3738 
SCOTT S. KUNKEL, #5303 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 484-3000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD MCPHERSON and ] 
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Civil No. 890902949 PD 
) Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion for New Trial or 
Entry of Judgment in favor of Defendnat, Motion to Tax Costs and 
Objection to Form of Judgment came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable John A. Rokich of the above-entitled Court 
on November 26, 1990, Larry G. Reed appearing on behalf of 
Defendant Vaughan Belnap and Scott S. Kunkel appearing on behalf 
of Plaintiffs, Joseph Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa McPherson-
Based upon the oral argument of counsel, study of the various 
motions and memoranda submitted on behalf of the parties, and 
good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1, Defendant Vaughan Belnap's Motion for a New Trial 
or Entry of Judgment in his favor is denied. 
JAN 2 4 1991 
Deputy Clerk 
JAMES E. MORTON #3738 
SCOTT S. KUNKEL #53 03 
THOMPSON, HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorneys For Plaintiffs 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone (801) 484-3000 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 4 1991 
SALT LAKE OOUM-^v 
Dfc+sul/ OlOfK 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH EDWARD McPHERSON and 
JOAN ELISSA McPHERSON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
VAUGHAN BELNAP and 
JEFFREY BELNAP, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 890902949 PD 
Judge John A. Rokich 
This case, came on regularly for a non-jury trial on August 
30, 1990, before The Honorable John A. Rokich, District Court 
Judge. Plaintiffs Joseph Edward McPherson and Joan Elissa 
McPherson, were represented by Scott S. Kunkel of Hatch, Morton & 
Skeen and Defendant Vaughan Belnap was represented by Larry G. 
Reed of Crowther & Reed. The Court having heard testimony of 
witnesses, reviewed documentary evidence and argument of counsel 
and being fully advised in the premises, and for good cause 
appearing, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. In or about September, 1988, Plaintiffs entered into a 
lease agreement with Defendant Vaughan Belnap wherein Vaughan 
entry into the Condominium• 
5. At all relevant times during the events giving rise to 
this action, Vaughan Belnap was the owner of the Condominium, and 
Plaintiff's personal property that was left at the Condominium 
and in the care, custody and control of Vaughan Belnap. 
6. The items of personal property that Vaughan Belnap did 
not return to Plaintiffs are as follows: 
Purchase Date 
Item Price Purchased 
Mitsubishi 35" television $ 2,900.00 1985 
Cannondale Mud Bike $ 600.00 5/87 
Fat Chance Bike $ 1,485.00 5/87 
G.E. Microwave $ 3 00.00 
Couch, Loveseat, two chairs 
and one ottoman made of 
elephant hide $ 6,000.00 
Persian Rug $ 700.00 
7. The Court believes that under the fact situation of the 
case, a bailment was created. Plaintiffs delivered to Defendant 
Vaughan Belnap, and not Jeffrey Belnap, the furniture with the 
express understanding that the furniture would be returned to 
Plaintiffs. 
8. The Court further believes that bailment was for the 
mutual benefit of both parties. The Plaintiff accommodated 
Defendant Vaughen Belnap in furthering the sale of the 
Condominium by moving out prior to the expiration of the lease 
and by allowing Vaughan Belnap to use the furniture in 
furtherance of the sale of the Condominium, to his son who had no 
furniture. 
9. Finally, the Court concludes that since this was a case 
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failing to return the furniture, as agreed. Defendant Vaughan 
Belnap failed to prove that the loss of the furniture was not the 
result of his negligence. 
4. As a result of the Defendant Vaughan Belnap breach of 
the bailment agreement by failing to return the furniture to 
Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs suffered damages in the amount of 
$6,000.00, together with their costs and interest. 
5. Interest on $6,000.00 in damages suffered by Plaintiffs 
shall accrue at the rate of 10% per annum prior to judment and 
12% after judgment and will begin to run from December 15, 1988 
until the time the judgment is paid in full. 
6. Additional reasons in support of the Court's decision 
is contained within the Plaintiff's trial brief. 
DATED this j£ <^ day of ^T^jucgn^ 1990. 
BY THE^COURT: 
1 
AJ1 # (Jl^i 
THEJHONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH 
District Court Judge 
APPROVE AS TO FORM: 
LARRY REED 
Attorney for Defendant Vaughn Belnap 
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